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Abstract 
In March 2006, the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS)-3 
experienced an unexpected thrusting event, which caused significant 
changes to its orbit.  Recovery from this anomaly was protracted, raising 
concerns during the Independent Review Team (IRT) investigation of the 
anomaly regarding the contingency response readiness.  The simulations 
and readiness exercises discussed in this paper were part of the response to 
the IRT concerns. 
This paper explains the various levels of simulation needed to enhance the 
proficiency of the Flight Dynamics Facility (FDF) and supporting 
elements in recovery from a TDRS contingency situation.  The main 
emergency to address is when a TDRS has experienced uncommanded, 
unreported, or misreported thrusting, causing a ground station to lose the 
ability to acquire the spacecraft, as happened in 2006.  The following 
levels of simulation are proposed: 
• Tests that would be performed by the individual support sites to 
verify that internal procedures and tools are in place and up to date 
• Tabletop simulations that would involve all of the key support sites 
talking through their respective operating procedures to ensure that 
proper notifications are made and communications links are 
established 
• Comprehensive simulations that would be infrequent, but realistic, 
involving data exchanges between ground sites and voice and 
electronic communications among the supporting elements   
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1. Introduction 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellite System (TDRSS) enables communication with and tracking of Earth-orbiting 
spacecraft.  The system is composed of nine spacecraft in low-inclination 
geosynchronous orbits positioned in assigned longitudinal slots around the Earth and the 
ground systems used to track and control them.  A Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
(TDRS) is controlled through the White Sands Complex (WSC) located in White Sands, 
New Mexico, under the direction of the Space Network (SN) Project of Code 452 at 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC).  The Flight Dynamics Facility (FDF) at 
GSFC is responsible for TDRS orbit determination (OD) and prediction.  
This paper presents a definition of TDRS contingency, a discussion of the roles of the 
various groups in contingency recovery, and proposed levels and types of simulation and 
testing to assure contingency response proficiency.  At this time, the only simulations that 
have been approved and conducted were group-only internal tests of the type described in 
Section 4.1using a TDRS-8 drift maneuver as a testing opportunity. 
A major consideration for the controlling agencies is that the TDRS spacecraft health and 
service to users be maintained.  Two recent anomalies, one in 2006 and one in 2007 are 
discussed to illustrate the types of problems that these agencies can face. 
1.1 TDRS-3 Anomaly 
On March 22, 2006, TDRS–3 had an Emergency Time Out (ETO) resulting in an attitude 
divergence leading to a protracted period of loss of service.  The anomaly included 
significant thrusting for over 2 hours until near 0300 UTC and minor thrusting continuing 
for another 10 hours until approximately 1300 UTC, when the thrusting ended.  The 
spacecraft was then drifting westward at a rate of 3 degrees per day.  Table 1 is adapted 
from the timeline as reported by the FDF to the ETO review team, 
 
Table 1.  TDRS-3 2006 Anomaly            
Date Time (UTC)  Event 
3/22   00  Loss of attitude control and loss of Earth reference 
3/22   03 End of 90 percent of thrusting 
3/22  13 End of last 10 percent of thrusting.  Tracking data taken during this period were unusable due to thrusting. 
3/22 14 TDRS-3 returned to normal mode, S-band tracking only 
3/22   15 FDF provided solution based on premaneuver data 
3/22   18 First pass of data received  
3/23   01   Third and last pass of data received  
3/23   0122 FDF reported being unable to generate a usable solution from the data.  
3/23   17  The first posttumble United States Strategic Command (US STRATCOM) solution is received   
3/23   20 FDF obtained a converged solution from three Canberra passes over 
a 7–hour arc using the US STRATCOM vector as initial conditions 
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Date Time (UTC)  Event 
3/23   21   FDF delivered a converged solution  
3/24 00 Maneuver to stop drift 
3/24  12  Maneuver to return the spacecraft to its box (to start drift back)  
3/24 18 Resumption of Bilateration Ranging Transponder System (BRTS) 
events 
3/28   02 Maneuver to slow drift 
3/28   14 Maneuver to stop drift and stay in the box 
3/28 19 TDRS-3 emergency terminated 
 
The FDF found that the orbit change due to the thrusting was approximately 4380 
kilometers in orbital position after 32 hours.  The concern from the anomaly review team 
was that the FDF did not succeed in performing OD until approximately 31 hours after 
the return of the TDRS to normal mode.  The investigation determined that the primary 
reason was the difficulty in acquiring sufficient usable tracking data to generate an orbit 
after such a large maneuver.  The data received from the Canberra site were the only 
good data received by the time the first orbit update was attempted at 0100 UTC on 
March 23.  However, the data covered only slightly more than a quarter of the orbit, not 
enough for a solution with data from a single station and with poorly known a priori 
elements.  It was not until US STRATCOM provided a better initial state vector that the 
FDF was successful in processing the data and updating the TDRS-3 orbit at 
approximately 2100 UTC on March 23.  
1.2 TDRS-5 Anomaly 
At 0420 UTC on July 10, 2007, TDRS-5 experienced what appeared to be a halt of the 
Attitude Control System (ACS) Control Processor Electronics (CPE), causing a loss of 
attitude control.  This resulted in a loss of K-band command and telemetry with a 
subsequent ETO and loss of user support capability.  The spacecraft then autonomously 
configured to S-band command and telemetry.  Table 2 shows the steps as the spacecraft 
control was reestablished, and TDRS-5 was brought back to operational support.  
 
Table 2.  TDRS–5 2007 Anomaly 
Date Time (UTC) Event 
7/10   
 0420 ACS CPE Halt and loss of Earth reference 
 0420 ETO, customer support transferred to TDRS-6 
 0801 Sun Acquisition Mode 
 1800 Earth Acquisition 
 1854 Normal Mode 
 2054 K-band Acquisition 
 2114 Resumption of TT&C data, no S-band TT&C data received 
 2130 Resumption of BRTS events 
 4  
Date Time (UTC) Event 
 2238 Complete payload activation 
 2326 First updated solution with 1 hour of BRTS data 
7/11   
 0115 Second updated solution with 3.5 hours of BRTS  data, no 
significant improvement in OD 
 0843 Resume routine customer support 
 
The FDF found that the orbit changes were 3 kilometers along track/day and a drift rate 
of 0.005 degrees/day.  Compared with the earlier TDRS-3 anomaly, the loss of control 
was for a shorter period, and there was no long-duration thrusting, so the change to the 
orbit was much less severe.  Also, TDRS-5 is located such that there were more tracking 
options available.  The circumstances of this anomaly did not take the spacecraft out of 
view of the BRTS, so reacquisition in K-band and restoration of BRTS tracking was done 
more rapidly than when recovering from the TDRS-3 anomaly.   
2. Definition of Contingency  
A TDRS contingency occurs whenever a TDRS is in a condition such that its attitude 
and/or orbit cannot be predicted or controlled within the limits needed for operational 
customer support or for maintaining its location within the geosynchronous orbit 
(Reference 1).  This can occur when a TDRS tumbles, has divergent attitude, or has 
uncontrolled thrusting.  WSC will declare a TDRS emergency when such an event occurs.   
This contingency definition is limited to TDRS tracking and control and does not include 
collision avoidance, although an important part of managing a contingency includes 
providing predicted ephemerides for use in analyzing the potential for close approaches.  
During such contingencies, the TDRS operational modes progress from loss of Earth lock 
to normal operations as control of the spacecraft is reestablished.  These modes are 
outlined in Table 3.  
Table 3.  TDRS Operational Modes 
Mode Status 
Tumble (attitude divergence) and 
loss of Earth lock 
No tracking, limited commanding, no user support for 
operational spacecraft.  Tracking and orbit support cannot 
be performed as long as the spacecraft is tumbling and/or 
under self-thrusting. 
Sun Acquisition Attitude under control, intermittent commanding there 
may or may not be sufficient tracking for OD.  
Earth Acquisition S-band tracking and full commanding.  Orbit prediction 
accuracy may not be sufficient for operational support. 
Normal Operations K-band tracking, BRTS events, full commanding and 
operational support.  A TDRS could be in normal 
operations mode but still be under contingency support.  
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The desire is to minimize the amount of time any given TDRS spends in a mode outside 
of normal operations because that impacts the SN ability to service its users.  
3. Response Guidelines 
The response to a TDRS contingency is based on the TDRS status (whether the 
spacecraft is operational or nonoperational), and whether the spacecraft location is in the 
East, West, or Zone of Exclusion (ZOE) slot (see Figure 1 and Table 4).  The first 
concern when a spacecraft anomaly occurs is the health of the spacecraft.  The various 
support entities are notified and their recovery and emergency procedures are initiated.  
Support from additional tracking facilities is requested if the TDRS has drifted out of 
view of its primary supporting antenna.  The various support entities coordinate their 
responses and act in concert when resolving issues for the SN service users.  This 
becomes more important if an anomaly is not resolved quickly and the service 
interruption becomes protracted.  
 
Figure 1.  TDRS Visibility and S-band Trackers 2 
                                                 
2
 Adapted from a chart of typical SN coverage at the equator distributed by Fred Pifer, July 2007. 
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Successful resolution must include, at a minimum, the abilities to acquire and track the 
TDRS, to provide valid tracking data to the FDF, and to generate good solutions and 
provide acquisition data.  Determining the source of the anomaly or achieving the return 
of the TDRS to operational support is not necessary to declare the contingency resolved.   
Table 4.  Ground Tracking Sites 
Ground Network Sites Antenna(s) Approximate TDRS Visibility 
Merritt Island, Florida MILA West, East 
Santiago, Chile AGO3 East 
Deep Space Network Sites   
Goldstone, California DS15/DS26/DS27 West 
Canberra, Australia DS45/DS46 West, ZOE 
Madrid, Spain DS65/DS66 East, ZOE 
Universal Space Network Sites   
Hawaii South Point (SP) West 
Alaska North Pole (NP) West 
Perth, Australia Dongara (DGR) West, ZOE 
 
3.1 Responses 
Each organizational entity involved in TDRS support has its own set of operational 
procedures that define in detail the steps to be taken during a TDRS emergency.  Table 5 
presents the responses expected to various TDRS contingencies. 
 
Table 5.  TDRS Contingency Mode Responses 
Mode SN/WSC/FDF Action 
SN Coordinate response  Contact users 
Tumble (attitude 
divergence) and loss 
of Earth lock WSC 
Declare spacecraft emergency 
Assess health of satellite 
Transition to S-band  
Take Random Access Memory (RAM) dumps, 
if possible 
Recycle onboard processors, if needed 
Enable gyros, catalyst bed heaters, and thrusters 
Configure for Sun mode 
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Mode SN/WSC/FDF Action 
WSC Orient solar arrays to Sun Induce spin about Sun line 
FDF Attempt OD Generate acquisition data 
Sun Mode 
SN Monitor responses and continue coordination 
WSC 
Attempt Earth acquisition at each opportunity 
(twice a day  in Sun Mode) 
Maneuver TDRS to retain/resume assigned slot 
FDF Continue OD efforts Generate acquisition data  
Earth Acquisition 
SN Continue coordination and user contact 
WSC Configure payload for user support Declare end of emergency 
FDF Perform normal post-maneuver support  Transition to K-band 
SN Continue coordination 
WSC Track the TDRS Provide valid tracking data to FDF 
FDF Generate good solutions Provide acquisition data 
Contingency 
Resolved 
SN Postcontingency evaluation 
 
During a contingency situation, the expectation is that ranging would be performed by 
any assets available for support.  The FDF would attempt OD when data becomes 
available.  There may be some limitations in the data that would reduce their 
effectiveness for orbit support, such as short data arcs, dropouts from spacecraft spin, or a 
lack of calibration of the tracking station equipment.  If the FDF experiences continued 
difficulty in generating a solution, the coordination meetings would be the forum to 
discuss requesting assistance from US STRATCOM or additional measures to improve 
station tracking.  
3.2 Ground Station Availability 
TDRS tracking of a BRTS transponder requires a K-band space–to–ground link.  Once a 
TDRS transitions to S-band up during an emergency, it no longer has BRTS lock.  When 
significant out–of–plane thrusting has occurred and BRTS events are not promptly 
resumed, additional tracking support is requested.  Table 4 lists the relevant ground sites 
and their approximate visibility.  The identification of some of the antennas at the sites is 
given, but this list is not complete.  These sites and the current TDRS locations are shown 
in Figure 1.  As this figure shows, the visibility from ground S-band trackers for ZOE 
TDRSs is quite limited.  
3.3 Contingency Support Coordination 
During contingency support activities, it is important that correct information be 
disseminated across the relevant agencies, that the customers be kept informed, and that 
difficulties identified in resolving the contingency be addressed.  It is also important that 
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consistent information be provided to all of the groups and that SN customers have a 
single source for this information.  
Once a contingency is declared, representatives from WSC, the FDF, and the SN prepare 
for teleconferences (telecons) or meetings to begin 8 hours after the declaration of the 
contingency.  The nominal schedule for the meetings is at the 8–hour, 12–hour, 16–hour, 
and 24–hour points, with modifications to that schedule as deemed necessary.  The 
meetings continue until the contingency is determined to be resolved.   
The representatives include: 
• WSC – Operations  
• FDF – FDF Operations Director, Flight Dynamics Support Services (FDSS) 
Operations Manager 
• SN – SN System Manager (SSM), SN Conjunction Assessment Point of Contact 
(POC) 
• FDF–Liaison to United States Strategic Command (US STRATCOM)  
Analysts and customer representatives can be invited as necessary.  
4. Simulations and Tests 
The purpose for performing simulations and tests is to assist in preparing support 
personnel for their role in a contingency, to monitor the ability of various support entities 
to respond quickly in a contingency, and to determine where there are insufficiencies that 
need to be addressed.  This section addresses proposed simulations and tests as well as 
what has been done to date.  
The intention is that proficiency simulations will occur at least annually using one of the 
simulations listed in Table 6, that is, one of the proposed levels will be selected for a 
given time period.  Before a simulation, the type, number of participants, initiation time, 
success criteria, proposed duration, and funding will be specified and approved by the SN 
Project.  A Simulation Coordinator will be appointed to set up the simulation, gain 
concurrence from the participants, initiate the simulation, and track and record the 
progress.  Following the simulation, a report will be prepared with the lessons learned 
and action items for distribution to the SN Project and the simulation participants. 
 
Table 6.  Proficiency Simulation Options 
Simulation Action Participant(s) 
Tests 
Verify that support procedures and tools are 
ready and personnel are trained.  Test that 
tools used in recovery operations execute 
properly. 
Success criteria:  proper and timely 
computations and notifications 
Each entity separately 
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Simulation Action Participant(s) 
Tabletop 
Entities step through operating procedures to 
check that proper communications are 
established and notifications sent and 
received.  
No exchange of data and solutions  
Performing a simulation after hours adds 
realism 
Success criteria:  Notifications received and 
responded to within a given time 
SN, WSC, FDF and possibly 
selected GN/DSN sites 
Comprehensive 
Realistic 
Exchange data and solutions 
Success criteria:  Correct and timely message 
traffic 
SN, WSC, FDF and one or 
more GN/DSN sites 
4.1 Tests  
Tests are performed by each supporting element separately and do not require 
coordination among the groups.  It is assumed that each element does internal testing on 
its own schedule, as each element is expected to maintain proficiency to be prepared to 
perform support.  
The FDF recently tested a potential response to a contingency by performing orbit 
support using TDRS-8 data from its recent repositioning.  The simulation presumed no a 
priori knowledge of a maneuver with receipt of acceptable tracking data immediately 
after the maneuver.  The OD was performed with tracking data before and after the 
maneuver.  No outside facilities were involved in this simulation other than the routine 
provision of TDRS data. 
The initial TDRS-8 drift stop maneuver, which ended at 0505 UTC on March 27, 2007, 
was used for this analysis.  The maneuver was not modeled in the input vector or in the 
Goddard Trajectory Determination System (GTDS) Differential Correction (DC) 
Program input to simulate an unreported thrusting by a TDRS.  The tracking data arc 
between this maneuver and the next maneuver was approximately 11 hours long and was 
composed solely of TT&C data from the Space Network Expansion (SNE) ground 
terminal.  The data were in 5-minute segments of approximately four segments per hour 
from 0600 to 1650 UTC on March 27.   
Using data immediately before the maneuver produced orbit solutions that converged but 
only used the data before the maneuver.  This solution did not model the maneuver and 
was not acceptable as a source of information on the postburn TDRS orbit.  Various 
techniques to force the solution to use the postmaneuver data were tried, but none were 
successful.  This included constraining the solution to the input plane, moving the epoch 
to force a better solution, applying a fixed solar radiation pressure coefficient instead of 
estimating the value, and opening up the edit criterion.   
Two points worthy of emphasis are that this maneuver had a rather large Delta-V, 
slowing the orbital velocity of the spacecraft by approximately 300 km/day and that the 
data arc was a short one of approximately 11 hours.  The maneuver window was from 
0500 to 0600 UTC on March 27, 2007. 
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The conclusions reached are 
• Over a short arc with no maneuver modeling, the FDF would be unable to 
generate a reliable orbit based on TT&C data from one station after a large 
maneuver 
• Future simulations to determine how large an unmodeled maneuver can be 
tolerated can be done by processing other past maneuvers of different sizes.   
4.2 Tabletop Simulation 
This section describes a proposed tabletop simulation exercise, which is currently under 
discussion.  No time frame has been established for performing this simulation.  
In a tabletop simulation, each of the participants sits around a table or in a teleconference 
with their respective procedures.  The Simulation Coordinator has a situation scripted 
with expected responses.  The success or failure of the simulation depends on how well 
the responses during the simulation match the expected responses, and how well the 
various procedures match what each participant expects from the others.  A variation on 
this would be that the actual time when the exercise is to be performed is not released in 
advance and part of the simulation is to see how long it takes the various participants to 
respond.  At the end of the simulated responses, there should be a Q&A or what-if period, 
a time for the participants to ask each other what they would have done if the parameters 
had been changed.  This provides a forum for developing procedures to further account 
for various scenarios.  The updated procedures can then be tested at the next internal test 
or tabletop simulation. 
The activities in Table 7 are in roughly chronological order, but they are expected to 
overlap one another.  The simulation clock need not run in real time.  That is, the 
Simulation Coordinator may elect to declare that a specific time has passed, say 8 hours 
of data collection, and advance the clock. 
Table 7.  Simulation of Response to Losing Contact with TDRS–West (TDW) 
Simulation 
Coordinator Participant Expected Action 
Response/Time 
Duration 
Give specific time 
and conditions for 
TDW loss of 
contact  
  Simulation Start (S) 
 
WSC Operations 
Supervisor Declare TDRS emergency S + 15 min 
 
WSC Operations 
Supervisor Contact SSM, SN Project S + 15 min 
Define data 
available on TDW 
health to WSC; 
TDW in Tumble 
  S + 30 min 
 WSC Operations  Report spacecraft health S + 1 hr 
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Simulation 






Contact FDF Operations 
Director, SN Conjunction 
Assessment POC 




Contact FDSS Operations 
Director and US STRATCOM 
POC 




Distribute schedule and 





Contact FDSS Operations 
Manager 
 
S + 2 hr 
Declare TDW in 






Contact FDF Orbit Analyst and 
FDF Operations Analyst S + 2 hr 
Declare TDW in 
Earth Acquisition 
Mode (S-band) 
   
Define tracking data 
available to FDF 
(TT&C) 




Report on evaluation of 
available tracking data and 
suitability for OD, whether or 
not additional tracking is 
needed. Request tracking 
coverage.   
S + 14 hr 
Define BRTS 
tracking available to 
FDF (K-band) 
  S + 16 hr 
 
FDF Orbit 
Analyst Report OD results S + 17 hr 
 SN, WSC, FDF Report status via telecon  S + 18 hr 
Define objects 




Report conjunction assessment 
results S + 19 hr 
 All Q&A/What-if period S + 20 hr 
4.3 Comprehensive Simulations 
Comprehensive simulations of TDRSS contingency support require considerable 
planning and preparation to assure that the exercise is worthwhile.  The SN, the FDF, and 
WSC would decide the objective of a simulation, the schedule and timeline, how the 
simulation is going to be conducted and monitored, and what measures of success are 
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expected.  It would be desirable to complete one or more successful tabletop simulations 
before attempting a comprehensive simulation to incorporate the lessons learned. 
The type of simulation envisioned is one in which a circumstance arises when a station 
from Table 4 is asked to provide tracking support for a TDRS during an emergency.  The 
steps in the simulation would include: 
• Making the request for support 
• Providing the station with acquisition data 
• Configuring the station to perform the tracking 
• Performing the tracking 
• Providing the data to the FDF 
• Processing the data within the FDF to generate a solution 
• Distributing ephemeris and acquisition data based on the new solution 
Measures of success of the simulation would be the timeliness of the communications, 
the validity of the tracking data, and the ability of the FDF to use the data to generate a 
new solution.  
Part of developing the simulation would be to decide how realistic a scenario would be 
used.  For example, the simulation presented above could include tracking a spacecraft 
and providing the data to the FDF, but it could also be one of recording data from 
previous tracking to provide to the FDF at the scheduled time.  The simulation would 
need to be developed in a way that would not impact normal operations.  Care would 
need to be taken to ensure that the simulation exercise is not confused with ongoing 
routine operations.   
5. Conclusions 
The ability to respond quickly and appropriately to a TDRS anomaly is important for 
maintaining the TDRS spacecraft health and providing continued service to users, as 
TDRS anomalies continue to be experienced about once a year.  Simulating a TDRS 
emergency provides an opportunity to prepare for contingencies and to determine any 
future actions that are needed to improve responses.  The goal is to mitigate the risk that a 
future severe TDRS anomaly will take as long to resolve as did the TDRS-3 anomaly in 
March 2006.  
WSC, the FDF, and the SN routinely perform internal tests, but they have not, as yet, 
held a coordinated TDRS contingency simulation.  The challenge is to develop a 
simulation program that fits within the time and budget constraints.  Performing 
appropriate simulations and tests would provide assurance that the emergency support 
procedures at the various support sites are sufficiently detailed and that personnel are 
well trained in their use.  
6. References 
1. 452-ICD-SN/FDF, The Interface Control Document Between the Space Network and 
the Flight Dynamics Facility, Appendix E, June 2007 
 
